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I. INTRODUCTION
"So far as the mere imparting of information is concerned, no university
has had any justification for existence since the popularization of print-
ing in the fifteenth century."
Alfred North Whitehead1
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 1967,
Amherst College; J.D. 1971, Yale Law School; member of the California Bar.
C) Copyright 1975 William K.S. Wang.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
CARNEG E CMu'N ON 110H.R EDUCATION, THE FouTH REvoLUToN-INsTRuC-
TIONAL TECHNOLOGY IN HIGHER aDUCA&TION (1972) [hereinafter cited as THE ForRTn
REVOLUTION];
C. HOULE, Tim ExT RNAL DEGREE (1973) [hereinafter cited as C. HoULE];
J. VON KALiNowsI, BusInmss ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGU-
LATION (1972) [hereinafter cited as J. VON KALINOWSm].
1. A.N. WmTEHEAD, THE AIMs Op EDUCATIoN 42 (1963).
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For many years universities organized along traditional lines have
almost totally dominated higher education. Until recently the uni-
versities' power could be justified because no other means of purveying
higher education was technically feasible. Improvements in com-
munications technology, however, have made possible the development
of degree-granting programs,2 often called "open universities," that are
no longer tied to the inflexible curriculum or expensive facilities and
programs of conventional universities. It is the thesis of this Article
that the current structure of the university system has retarded this de-
velopment and that an antitrust attack on the monopolistic practices of
private universities3 is feasible and should be successful.4
2. For a general discussion of external degree programs, see COMMISSION ON NON-
TRADITIONAL STUDY, Drvnsrry BY DESIGN (1973); R. FLAUGHER, M. MAHONEY & R.
MESSING, CREDIT BY EXAMINATION FOR COLLEGE-LEVEL STUDIES: AN ANNOTATED Bm-
LIOGRAPHY (1967); C. HOULE 87-119; 0. MILTON, ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRADITIONAL
77-89; Openness-The New Kick in Education, 1972 (Ford Foundation Reprint); Boyer
& Keller, The Big Move to Non-Campus Colleges, 54 SATURDAY Rv., July 17, 1971,
at 46.
The State University of Nebraska has established a resource library in which most
innovative and non-traditional educational programs are recorded.
3. State universities would probably be immune to antitrust attack under the Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942), state-action exemption to the Sherman Act. In Parker,
the Court stated: "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its his-
tory which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 350-51. Commenting on Parker, one writer
has concluded that "state agencies have enjoyed almost absolute immunity from the anti-
trust laws, and attempts to distinguish the activities as proprietary rather than govern-
mental in nature have met with little success," Note, Emerging Limitations on the Im-
munities of State Action and the Efforts to Influence Governmental Action Under the
Sherman Act, 1 MEuMIns ST. U.L. REv. 323, 325 (1971). See also Comment, Antitrust
Immunity: State Action Protection Under Parker v. Brown, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 453, 465-
67 (1973). Citing Parker, the Fifth Circuit in Saenz v. University Interscholastic
League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973), held that the University Interscholastic League,
a bureau of the Extension Division of the University of Texas, was "a governmental
entity exempt from the Sherman Act." Id. at 1027.
4. One compelling reason that innovation is needed is that the costs of a traditional
university education are rapidly escalating. The College Entrance Board's College
Scholarship Service makes the following projections of yearly college costs in 1974-75:
commuting students
two-year public college: $1,922 (up 15.4%) [from the previous year]
four-year public college: $2,085 (up 17.5%)
four-year private college: $3,683 (up 16.5%)
residential students
two-year private college: $3,617 (up 13.2%)
four-year public college: $2,400 (up 7%)
four-year private college: $4,039 (up 9.4%)
College Bills to Pay? Brace Yourself, CHANGING TIMES, July 1974, at 4.
See The Squeeze on Education, FORBES, Sept. 15, 1974, at 37; College: Still Higher Tabs
for Higher Education, BusINESS WEEK, July 13, 1974, at 11.
Because of direct and indirect government subsidies, endowment income, and pri-
[Vol. 1975:53
UNBUNDLING EDUCATION
This Article analyzes the four distinct services performed by uni-
versities and describes recent experiments in offering the services
separately. A system which offers these four functions in a package
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is referred -to as a "bundled system,"
whereas an "unbundled" system offers the functions separately. The
Article will discuss the application of the antitrust laws to the private
nonprofit college generally5 and to the specific university practice of
tying its various services together. The rigidities of the existing bun-
dled educational system then will be contrasted with the benefits of
unbundling education.
A. The Four Functions of Traditional University Systems
Because of a degree's usefulness in our credential-oriented soci-
ety, most students attend a university principally to earn a degree; but
universities are not just degree-granting, accrediting institutions. They
in fact perform four different and quite distinct functions: impartation
of information, accreditation, coercion, and club membership.
Impartation of Information. A major function performed by uni-
versities is the impartation of information. In American undergraduate
education, the live lecture is the most commonly used method of trans-
mitting information from the instructor to the students, as it has been
since the inception of the university in medieval Europe.6 Today,
seminars are infrequent, and tutorials rarer still. At live lectures the
majority of the students behave more like the passive audience at a
play than active participants in an academic pursuit, although occasion-
vate gifts, the cost to society of educating a student considerably exceeds tuition costs.
A dramatic example is Yale University, where the estimated cost of instruction per stu-
dent for 1974-75 is $7,460, and the tuition and fees for that period are $3,650. The
Squeeze on Education, supra at 38; cf. Where Does the Money Go?, FOREFS, Sept. 15,
1974, at 120. See generally CARNEGIE CoM 'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EI)UCA-
TION: WHO PAYS? WHO BENEFITS? WHO SHOULD PAY? (1973); E. CHEIT, THE NEw
DEPRESSION IN HIGHER EDUCAToN-Two YEARS LATER (1973); COMMITTEE FOR ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCING OF COLLEGES (1973).
5. For a discussion of the Sherman Act's application to nonprofit corporations gen-
erally, see H. TOULMIN, 6 ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UN ED STATES § 12.43C (Supp.
1973); Nawalanic, Motives of Non-Profit Organizations and the Antitrust LMvs, 21
CLEV. ST. L. Rlv. 97 (1972).
6. See generally C. HAsKINS, THE PsE OF UNrvERsrrms 61 (1923). Several of
the original functions of the lecture system, including reading texts so that students could
correct handcopied manuscripts, axe now obsolete. Id. at 58. The scarcity of books
in the Middle Ages also created an early need for anti-monopolistic ordinances in uni-
versity cities: "Tlhe sale of books was hedged in by close restrictions designed to curb
monopoly prices and to prevent their removal from town." Id. at 52.
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ally genuine dialogue develops between the professor and the boldest
students -in a class. These lectures usually develop around a basic text-
book purchased by the students. Generally, the text is neither written
by the lecturer nor published by a company associated with the uni-
versity. Students are sometimes assigned course papers which require
the use of the university library, the cost of which is included in the
students' tuition. Nevertheless, non-textbook source material plays a
relatively unimportant information-transfer role in undergraduate
education.
Accreditation. Accreditation services consist of grading the work
of students and awarding degrees. To test the proficiency of students,
the professor may give periodic written examinations or assign course
papers or other projects. Students ordinarily receive final grades upon
the completion of each semester or quarter of study. Most universities
require a minimal level of cumulative performance for continued en-
rollment. Students desire this accreditation function because it pro-
vides periodic feedback on performance and an achievement record
that enhances employment opportunities. The accreditation process is
completed for a student when the university measures his record
against the requirements prescribed by the university for the awarding
of a particular degree. Aside from its historical basis, -the degree-
awarding function is somewhat puzzling. The general public attaches
great importance to the awarding of a diploma, but usually the only
real services rendered by the university in this process are counting the
number of passed courses, checking to see whether certain distribu-
tional requirements have been met, and calculating the student's grade
point average. As long as degrees -are granted on the basis of such
automatic formulae, the diploma itself adds no significant information
about the student which the transcript could not already provide.
Coercion. Universities form a crucible in which the professors,
the school administration, and peer-group influence -all place pressure
on -the student to perform his or her work. 7 Some professors use the
threat of an unannounced quiz 'to encourage preparation for each class,
while others call on students and publicly berate those who are un-
prepared. By imposing inflexible deadlines, the university increases
the pressures which influence student behavior. Each semester, a
student must ordinarily enroll in courses which are worth a minimum
7. Many professors and university administrators might view coercion as the least
important function of the university, but for many students it may be even more impor-
tant than impartation of knowledge.
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number of "credits." If he fails to master the material of a course by
the date of examination, the student receives a failing grade, a blemish
on his record. Similarly, if he fails to finish a paper by an assigned
deadline, undergraduate professors usually lower the student's grade
for -the course. In most colleges, after a certain grace period has
elapsed, a student may not drop a course without receiving a failing
grade. In addition, -there are other penalties for dropping a course
after the grace period. Tuition is not refunded, and the substitution
of another course is not permitted. Most students are also concerned
about being -branded a failure in the eyes of -their fellow students. This
influence inspires at least minimal performance. While these pres-
sures often have undesirable side effects such as neuroses and mental
breakdowns, many students value the coercive features of the uni-
versity and would probably be less comfortable with a system that de-
manded a heavier reliance on their own initiative and motivation.
Without this coercion, most students might lack the will power to study
intensively, even though, theoretically, -they could master college-level
work simply by systematic reading.
Club Membership. This concept is especially prevalent in the
British university system, where the phrase "the old school ti&' is used
to connote the social and business affinity of those who have attended
the same college or public school. In its more attenuated form in the
United States, the club membership" function has two aspects: (1)
exclusiveness and (2) interaction (social as well as intellectual).
Since leading universities accept only a relatively small percentage
of those who apply, being accepted is similar to being asked to join
a rather exclusive club. Acceptance itself is a confirmation of one's
intelligence.9 If the student actually attends one of these leading uni-
versities, he will have the opportunity to associate with -those of similar
intellectual abilities and eventually with those graduates of the school
who have distinguished themselves. This arrangement may easily re-
dound to the student's advantage as these relationships mature into
significant opportunities in the job market.
Club membership has a second aspect that does not depend on
the exclusiveness of the school's admission policy. It is the opportunity
for residential university students to interact with other students. In-
8. This concept should be distinguished from membership in a social fraternity or
sorority. The club described here is composed of the entire student body of a university.
9. However, in some circles, it is considered in bad taste to boast about being ac-
cepted at schools which a student does not actually attend, Almost no one puts such
informatom on his resum ,
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formally, this might take the form of intellectual bull sessions. On a
more formal level, students may join special interest clubs that sponsor
activities directed at particular academic areas.
B. Attempts at Unbundling
Although the current structure of the university system is en-
crusted with tradition, other means do exist now for instructing college
students. 0 In Britain, new methods of information impartation have
been incorporated into a program called the Open University, which
offers students an opportunity to earn a college degree while continuing
to work. The Open University employs a variety of techniques and
technologies, including television, radio, brief summer school sessions,
and centers replete with tutors and counselors. 1 The number of
American counterparts to Britain's Open University has been growing.
Chicago's innovative TV College' 2 has been joined by Empire State
10. For example, video cassettes are now commercially available. The cassette can
be used to record a televised lecture series. The student can "play" the cassette on a
television set that has been modified. Various organizations now offer instruction by
this means; for example, advertisements for Time-Life video cassette series have ap-
peared in Time. One such advertisement was captioned "Learn speed reading from Dick
Cavett on your own prime time." Time-Life also offers Kenneth Clark's "Civilization"
series on video cassettes. In late 1973, Seton Hall Law School was awarded a grant
by the Exxon Foundation and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to pro-
duce and distribute a complete video cassette law course on "Women and the Law." 27
Law School News, December 1973, at 2.
San Francisco's public library is establishing a video resource center with video
tapes and closed circuit television sets. Maloney, TV Freaks to Invade Reader's Last
Bastion, San Francisco Progress, Aug. 17, 1974, at 16, col. 1.
11. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATiON, Naw STuDENTs AND NEw PLAcES-
POLICIES FOR THE FUTuRE GRowTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 112-13 (1971); C. HOULE 34-38; W. Perry, Britain's Open University, in UNivER-
SAL HIGHER EDUCATION COSTS, BENEFITS, OPTIONS 287-92 (L. Wilson & 0. Mills, eds.
1972); Symposium: The Open University-A Case Study in Education Technology, in
5 ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 38-75 (D. Packham, A. Cleary & T. Mayes
eds. 1971); Walsh, The Open University: Breakthrough for Britain?, 174 SCIENCE 675
(1971); Weintraub, Britislh Open a College for Dropouts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1971,
at 37, col. 1. For a description of similar developments in Sweden, Japan, and West
Germany, see THE FouRTH REVOLUTION 25-27.
The University of London has long had a program offering degrees to any student
who passed the required examinations even if he has not received any formal instruction.
C. HOULE 20-27. For a discussion of foreign external degree programs generally, see
id. at 18-44.
For an excellent bibliography of the literature on external degrees, see id. at 187-
208.
12. The TV College, now in its thirteenth year, offers an associate in arts to those
who complete its program of broadcast television instruction. For a general discussion
of credit for television courses, see Sharon, College Credit for Off-Campus Study 8-10,
1971 (Bethesda, Maryland, ERIC Document Reproduction Service ED 048 520).
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College, a New York university which has no campus, classrooms,
laboratories, or libraries. 3 Similar independent courses of study are
now offered by the University Without Walls, a degree-granting con-
sortium of twenty-nine colleges. 14
Other state universities, including those of Oklahoma, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Florida, Vermont, California, and Hawaii, are ex-
perimenting with various types of less extreme external degree pro-
gpamsYs With support from the federal government's National Insti-
tute of Education, the State of Nebraska has created the State Univer-
sity of Nebraska, an open university or "university without walls" which
will offer college courses through educational television, textbooks,
newspapers, correspondence, video cassettes, sound-tape cassettes, and
regional resource centers.' 6 The National Institute of Education also
hopes -to establish an open university for -the entire Middle West, called
the "University of Mid-America," which would provide instruction to
students who cannot afford to attend college on campus.
Other programs offer courses related to a particular subject. In
cooperation with the University of California Extension, Psychology
Today offers two separate introductory psychology courses in the for-
mat of either an independent study plan 8 or independent study sup-
plemented by television programs shown by local educational television
stations. 9 Another new program is Courses by Newspaper, which is
13. C. HoUrLE 97-100. Students are guided by "mentors" who help them to work
out a flexible educational program leading to a degree. Id.
14. CARNEGIE COM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE CAMPUS AND THE CrrY-MAX-
IMIZING AssETs AND REDUCING LIABILITIES 57-58 (1972); C. HOULE 111-16; TIME, Aug.
28, 1972, at 40-42; Ehrich, Off-Campus U, Wall Street J., Feb. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
15. CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 14, at 55-57; CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 11,
at 114-15; C. HOULE 100-11, 176-77.
16. The State University of Nebraska has published a series of nine undated mimeo-
graphed essays with the following titles: The S-U-N Concept-Bringing Education to
People; Nebraska-An Ideal Location for an Open Learning System; Review of Litera-
ture on Nontraditional Higher Education; The S-U-N Target Population; S-U-N-The
Instructional Design Dimension; The S-U-N Delivery System in the State of Nebraska;
The S-U-N Resource Center; S-U-N Research and Evaluation; The History of S-U-N
and Its Organizational Structure.
17. Spivak, Lack of Political Clout in Congress Threatens Once-Glamorous Na-
tional Institute of Education, Wall Street I., June 28, 1974, at 30, col. 1.
18. The independent study course includes programmed study manuals, a textbook,
long-playing records, self-check quizzes, and computer-scored examinations. Those who
successfully complete the course receive five credits from the University of California
Extension.
19. The television course consists of eighteen half-hour television programs, a text-
book, a study guide, a film guide, records, self-tests, and a series of computer-scored ex-
aminations. The University of California, San Diego, will grant eight extension credits
to those who complete the course. PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1973, at 75.
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fundect by the National Endowment for the Humanities and admin-
istered by the University of California, San Diego, Extension. The first
course, "America and the Future of Man," started in newspapers all
over ,the country in October, 1973.20
Tutoring services are also developing. In Chicago, there is a
"Learning Exchange" which matches tutors and pupils. When a per-
son telephones the Exchange and expresses interest in learning 'a cer-
tain subject, he is given the names, backgrounds, and telephone num-
bers of those who have registered to teach that subject. If no teacher
is available, the student's name is kept on file until a tutor registers. 2'
New York State has a similar program run by the Central New York
Regional Learning Service, established by a grant from thei United
States Office of Education. One of the Regional Learning Service's
programs is a Regional Instructional Reserve which maintains a com-
puterized list of all local people qualified (in the judgment of academic
panels) to serve as tutors in different subjects.22
These developments have received the encouragement of several
groups that have studied contemporary higher education. The Car-
negie Commission on Higher Education has recommended "that state
and federal government agencies, as well as private foundations, ex-
pand programs of support for the development of external degree sys-
tems and open universities . . . and has urged "the development
and utilization of outstanding instructional programs and materials for
use with new educational hardware."24  The Commission hopes that
by the year 2000 there will be widespread "availability of education
through independent study both within and without traditional institu-
tions . . .through applications of the expanding technology. '25  The
Commission on Non-traditional Study has made similar recommenda-
tions:
20. C. HotLE 183; TIdE, Jan. 21, 1974, at 53; see Evening Tribune (San Diego),
Oct. 4, 1973, § A, at 6, col. 1. To receive UCSD Extension Credit for the course, stu-
dents must pay $45, which entites them to a package containing supplementary lectures,
a study guide, tests, a record, and a learning game, all published by CRM, the owner
of Psychology Today. PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 1973, at 75; Evening Tribune (San
Diego), Oct. 4, 1973, § A, at 6, col. 1.
21. Brown, In Chicago, It's Easy to Find Someone to Teach Lion Taming or Any-
thing Else, Wall Street J., April 10, 1973, at 14, col. 2.
22. C. HouLn 117.
23. CARNEGm COMM'N, supra note 11, at 117. Similar recommendations are made
in the following studies: CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, LEss TIME, MORE
OPTIONS-EDUCATION BEYOND THE HIGH SCHOOL 20 (1971); TE FouRTH REVOLUTION'
51-53, 92-94.
24. THE FoutRT REvoLutnoN 48.
25. Id. at 93.
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Degrees should sometimes be awarded wholly by examination if
two conditions are met: the institution concerned is an established and
reputable educational authority; and valid and reliable examinations are
available to test the attainment of the degree's objectives. 26
[I]n exceptional cases, under conditions which are carefully
controlled by quality standards, degrees should be awarded by non-
teaching institutions .... 2 7
There are also some indications that accreditation is being offered
as a separate function. Students who participate in the College Level
Examination Program (CLEP) of the College Entrance Examination
Board are able to demonstrate their college-level proficiency by exam-
ination on various subjects no matter when, where, or how this knowl-
edge was acquired.28  The Board of Regents of -the University of the
State of New York 9 and the Board of Higher Education of the State
of New Jersey 0 have both established external degree-granting pro-
grams3 based on CLEP tests, United States Armed Forces Institute
examinations, and the New York-New Jersey program's own college
proficiency examinations.3 2  One group, the 1971 Assembly of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences on University Goals and Gov-
ernance, has advocated the establishment of national and institutional
examinations to enable students to receive credit for knowledge ac-
quired through experience and independent study.33
26. COMMSSION ON NoN-TRADirONAL STUDY, supra note 2, at 131. The Commis-
sion on Non-Traditional Study was created in 1971 by the Carnegie Corporation, the
College Entrance Examination Board, and the Educational Testing Service.
27. Id. at 133.
28. C. HouLr 75-76, 117-18; Sharon, supra note 12, at 13-14.
29. University of the State of N.Y., The Regents External Degree-Handbook of
Information for Candidates, 1972. See also C. HOTuLE 94-97.
30. Thomas A. Edison College, 1973-74 Bulletin: The External Degree Program
of the State of New Jersey.
31. The term "external degree" has a vague definition. Houle defines an external
degree as "one awarded to an individual on the basis of some program of preparation
(devised either by himself or by an educational institution) which is not centered on
traditional patterns of residential collegiate or university study." C. HouLn. 14-15. The
New York and New Jersey programs are examples of the most extreme form of the ex-
ternal degree program, which allows the student to prepare for examinations in any man-
ner that he sees fit. See authorities cited in notes 29 & 30 supra.
32. In 1973 these three-hour proficiency tests were administered in May and Octo-
ber at a cost of $15 and $25 per examination. There were no prerequisites set for any
of the examinations which covered material comparable to that in college courses. Ex-
aminations vary in format and may include multiple choice, short answer, essay, and
problem questions. Thomas A. Edison College, supra note 30, at 14-44; University of
the State of N.Y., supra note 29, at 7; New York State Education Department, College
Proficiency Examinations, 1973.
33. See State Univ. of Neb., Review of Literature on Nontraditional Higher Educa-
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The general concept that universities offer their functions as
separate services also has been endorsed by the federal government.
A task force concerned with higher education and commissioned by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare recommended in 1971:
We believe it is time for a different approach to making higher
education more available and more stimulating to those people unable
to attend a college full-time . . . . We propose that the resources for
education provided as a package by the college (formal instruction,
reading, libraries, examinations, degrees, etc.) be provided to the com-
munity as separate services in order that individuals and groups can find
their own way to an education.
We believe that there are literally millions who can benefit from
new approaches to an education ....
If separate organizations are established that provide the traditional
functions of the college directly to the community, individuals can fash-
ion and legitimize their own programs ....
While at first glance the functions of a college seem inseparable,
closer examination would indicate that their separation is not only pos-
sible, but would have advantages. 34
In a more general way, Congress has approved these approaches.
One goal for the federal Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary
Education35 is "the establishment of institutions and programs based on
the technology of communications."36 The Fund also is to be used to
work towards "the creation of new institutions and programs for exam-
ining and awarding credentials to individuals. .. .
Changes are needed in the existing university system in, order to
make higher education available to students of modest economic
means. The foregoing material indicates that some progress in this
direction has already taken place. At this stage, however, the market
for individual educational services can hardly be considered competi-
tive. The market incentive to provide independent courses of study
could be greatly improved if prestigious universities were required to
sell accreditation as a separate product. This change would remove
some of the stigma that has grown up around education provided by
"correspondence" type schools. One possible means of bringing about
this change is federal antitrust law.
tion (undated mimeographed pamphlet), citing AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCi-
ENcEs, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY ON UNIVERSrrY GoALs AND GOVERNANCE (1971).
34. F. NEWMAN, REPORT ON HIGHER EDUCATION 68-69 (1971).
35. See 20 U.S.C. § 1221d (Supp. II, 1972).
36. Id. § 1221d(a)(3).
37. Id. § 1221d(a)(8) (emphasis added).
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II. APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW38
The federal antitrust law which would most likely apply is section
1 of the Sherman Act."' It outlaws every combination in restraint
of trade or commerce among the states.4 ° However, antitrust law does
not reach restraints of trade which either qualify for an exemption or
fail to satisfy jurisdictional requirements.
A. "Learned Profession" Exemption
To block the application of federal antitrust laws, universities
might interpose the "learned profession!' exemption. The rationale for
this exemption is that members of a profession are not engaged in trade
or commerce41 and that therefore the jurisdictional language of the
Sherman Act does not reach their activities. The problems of success-
fully asserting this defense are legion. First, the exemption itself is
a rather flimsy construct built by lower courts upon Supreme Court
dicta. "  It has never been specifically endorsed by the Supreme
38. Of course, restraints of trade by universities also may violate state antitrust laws.
There appears to be extremely little statutory or judicial discussion of the applicability
of state antitrust laws to educational institutions. In 1971, one commentator examined
the various state antitrust statutes and concluded "there currently does [sic] not appear to
be any state antitrust statutes mentioning or disclosing any application of antitrust viola-
tions to non-profit corporations." Nawalanic, supra note 5, at 111. There have been
a few cases in which schools and colleges have been sued by small businessmen contest-
ing regulations which were alleged to interfere arbitrarily with their businesses. These
suits have been largely unsuccessful. See Ken Stanton Music, Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
227 Ga. 393, 181 SXE.2d 67 (1971); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204
(1913); Casey County Bd. of Educ. v. Luster, 282 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. App. 1955); Jones
v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N.W. 495 (1902). Contra, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn.
527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). For a discussion of several of these cases, see Coons, Non-
Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705, 709-21 (1962).
39. Tying arrangements have been held illegal under both section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), and section 3 of the Clayton Act, id. § 14. Although the
literal terms of the Clayton Act refer to exclusive dealing contracts, the section has been
held to apply to tying contracts. See International Business Machs. Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936). The Clayton Act is not of direct concern to the uni-
versities because it restricts only sales of "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, sup-
plies, or other commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
40. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (emphasis added).
41. See Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws,
1974 DuKE L.J 1164, 1195.
42. Two Supreme Court decisions contain the dicta that are the basis of this exemp-
tion. In Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922), the Court said that "the [baseball] exhibition, although made for money would
not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words." Id.
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Court"8 and has been soundly criticized. 44  Although the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar45 recently accepted the "learned
profession" exemption, 40 two later district court decisions cast doubt on
its vitality.47 Moreover, the term "learned profession" has never been
comprehensively defined in the context of the federal antitrust law.
The -traditional definition of the learned professions-theology,
law, and medicine 4s-would exclude the work of most university pro-
fessors. Furthermore, the cases discussing this exemption frequently
suggest that a basis for different treatment is the effort of professionals
to raise their own ethical standards. 49  University professors, however,
do not have a professional association with the power to prevent one
who has violated -the association's ethical standards from continuing to
teach. Thus, the "learned profession!' exemption might not apply 'to
university professors. Even if professors qualify for the exemption,
at 209. The second case is FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). In this case,
which arose under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), the
Court in dictum explained: "Of course, medical practitioners ...are not in com-
petition with respondent. They follow a profession and not a trade, and are not en-
gaged in the business of making or vending remedies, but in prescribing them." Id.
at 653.
The most recent lower court decision to uphold the "learned profession" exemption,
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223
(1974), placed heavy reliance on the Raladam dicta. Id. at 13.
43. In two later decisions, the Supreme Court carefully avoided deciding whether
the antitrust laws contain an exemption for the professions. See United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950); American Medical Ass'n
v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943). However, the Supreme Court may have
to make a definitive ruling on the issue when it decides Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. CL 223 (1974).
44. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 41, at 1195-1200; Note, Antitrust Law: An Ap-
plication of the Sherman Act to the Professions, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 740, 761-62 (1973);
Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other "Non-Commer-
cial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313, 324-31, 336-37 (1972).
45. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. CL 223 (1974).
46. Id. at 13-14.
47. United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 43 U.S.L.W. 2269
(D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1974) ('The concept of a learned profession exception to the antitrust
laws is of dubious validity in view of the repeated reluctance of federal courts to recog-
nize it as a legitimate exception to the Sherman Act."); United States v. Oregon State
Bar, 385 F. Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974) ("IThe 'learned profession' dicta in these two
cases [Raladam Co. and Federal Baseball Club] have no current vitality ... I." d.
at 515).
48. See W mSTER's THRmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicnioNARY 1286 (unabridged
1961).
49. See Levin v. Doctors Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 953, 954 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See generally 16F J. voN KALrNOWSKI
§ 49.02[1], at 49-8 to 49-9; Comment, supra note 41, at 1200-07.
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universities have a further problem. As even the Goldfarb court
recognized, "[t]he 'learned profession' exemption is a defense to a
Sherman Act violation only where the restraint is upon the learned pro-
fession itself."50  When universities restrain commerce or competition
in educational markets, the restraint affects independent organizations
offering educational services but not the professional activities of pro-
fessors. Thus, any attempt by universities to assert a defense based
on the "learned profession" exemption would fail.
B. Noncommercial Intent Exemption
Universities might argue that they qualify for ,the noncommercial
intent exemption recently endorsed in Marjorie Webster Junior Col-
lege, Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges & Secondary Schools,
Inc."' Marjorie Webster Junior College is a profit-making proprietary
college, and -the Middle States Association is a nonprofit educational
corporation which accredits institutions of higher and secondary educa-
tion.52 Marjorie Webster contended that Middle States and its mem-
bers had restrained the junior college's trade in violation of section 3
of the Sherman Act53 by acquiring monopoly power over regional ac-
creditation in the mid-atlantic region and by using this power to inhibit
competition from proprietary (privately-owned, profit-oriented) edu-
cational institutions. Middle States flatly refused to accredit any col-
lege that was not a "nonprofit organization with a governing board
representing the public interest."54  Because of Marjorie Webster's
non-accredited status, several accredited senior colleges and univer-
sities rejected transfer applications and credits from its graduates,53
thereby handicapping the junior college's recruitment of high school
graduates.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that this
restraint did not violate -the Sherman Act. The court held that "an inci-
dental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect the com-
50. 497 F.2d at 15.
51. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). This deci-
sion is noted in 20 AM. U.L. REv. 200 (1970); 84 IAv. L. REv. 1912 (1971); 56 VA.
L. REv. 1492 (1970). See also J. BRUBACHER, THE CouRTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION
110-13 (1971).
52. 432 F.2d at 652. Middle States accredits schools. Of course, this function is
totally different from the accreditation of students discussed earlier.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). This section uses the same language as section one of
the Sherman Act, but it applies only to the District of Columbia and to Territories.
54. 432 F.2d at 652-53.
55. Marjorie Webster could only show that eleven educational institutions rejected
the transfer of its credits because of a lack of accreditation. 1d. at 656 n.33.
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mercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant application
of the antitrust laws. ' 56 The rationale of Marjorie Webster has been
severely criticized by several commentators, 57 and the exemption that
it creates may be on the same shaky legal basis as the "learned profes-
sion" exemption. Nevertheless, even if Marjorie Webster is good law,
its protection of incidental restraints is too small a shield for the giant
universities. Universities might plausibly argue -that the tying of lec-
tures ,to examinations is not commercially motivated; however, they will
not be able to show that the restraint is only incidental. The Marjorie
Webster court believed -that the junior college could operate successfully
without accreditation and that therefore the effect of -the denial of ac-
creditation was incidental."' The impact of the universities' restraint
on independent study organizations is far more severe. As a conse-
quence of -the current university structure, few students, after paying
tuition, have additional funds to purchase study aids. Obviously, in-
dependent study firms could do much more business and take advan-
tage of economies of scale if all students had the option of shifting a
substantial part of the funds that they spend for university instruction
to the purchase of independently offered study aids.
C. Effect on Interstate Commerce
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only those restraints of
trade which pertain to "trade or commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations."5 9 This phrase has been construed to be as
broad as the constitutional limits of congressional power to regulate
commerce. 60 Therefore, the Supreme Court's substantial expansion of
the commerce clause0 ' has also widened the application of the Sherman
Act.
In the words of the Court, "[i]t is well established that an activity
which does not occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope
56. Id. at 654-55.
57. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 41, at 1209; 84 HARv. L. REv. 1912, 1918-20
(1971).
58. 432 F.2d at 658.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
60. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558
(1944); C. HILLs, ANTITRUST ADvIsER 17-19 (1971); 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI § 5.01[l],
at 5-8, 5-17.
61. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
See also Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime,
15 Amiz. L. Rav. 271 (1973).
[Vol. 1975:53
UNBUNDLING EDUCATION
of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce."0' 2
The extent to which the activities of an educational institution affect
interstate commerce,63 of course, depends upon the character of the
institution in question. In most cases, however, this requirement
should not prove to be a formidable obstacle to the application of anti-
trust law to universities. So long as the contested activity is one ulti-
mately affecting competition in interstate markets, the Sherman Act's
interstate commerce requirement will be satisfied. 64  "If it is interstate
commerce which feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze.""5  In the case of higher educa-
tion, the separate sale of educational functions would unquestionably
cause many students to substitute books and other materials for lec-
tures. Since the market for textbooks and educational materials is un-
deniably interstate in character, 6 the tying arrangements of even the
most local college would meet the Sherman Act requirement of affect-
ing interstate commerce. Furthermore, the general education pro-
grams of universities affect several other national markets, since most
universities and colleges nationally attract students, obtain supplies,
hire faculty, solicit alumni for contributions, sponsor paid-admission
athletic competitions, and belong to interstate collegiate associations.
D. Special Antitrust Exemption for Higher Education
The Supreme Court possibly could create an antitrust exemption
for higher education on the ground that the Sherman Act was not in-
62. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967), citing United States v. Employing
Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954), and Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); see P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusr ANALYSIS 120-22
(2d ed. 1974); Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED.
B.J. 283 (1965); Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DuKE L.I. 236; Kro-
tinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 W. RES.
L. REv. 66 (1963); cf. Comment, Private Physician Unions: Federal Antitrust and
Labor Law Implications, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 983, 995-99 (1973).
63. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). One leading commentator has
summarized:
The phrase "restraints affecting commerce" can become meaningful only where
there is a clear understanding of the types of restraints which are encompassed
in the phrase, of the necessary nexus between the restraint and interstate com-
merce, of the point in time when the restraint may be imposed, of the extent
to which the restraint must interfere with interstate commerce, and the like.
16 J. VON KALINOWSKI § 5.01[3], at 5-69 to -70.
64. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
65. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
66. The Supreme Court has held that the transportation of books, papers, and illus-
trative apparatus by a correspondence school to its students and agents located in other
states is interstate commerce within the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States. See International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
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tended to regulate the internal affairs of private universities. However,
one leading commentator has observed that "the Supreme Court and
Congress have, in the main, been reluctant-at least since the 1930's-
to create or expand antitrust exemptions and have instead placed their
principal faith in the efficacy of free competition, or, as a substitute,
detailed economic regulation."67  In 1944, the Court refused to even
consider an argument that an implied exemption of insurance com-
panies from the antitrust laws would benefit the public:
Opinions [have been] expressed by various persons that unrestricted
competition in insurance results in financial chaos and public injury.
Whether competition is a good thing for the insurance business is not for
us to consider. Having power to enact the Sherman Act, Congress did
so; if exceptions are to be written into the Act, they must come from the
Congress not this Court.68
Nevertheless, Congress has been willing to listen to special inter-
est groups seeking an exemption from antitrust laws. For example,
in response to the Court's decision quoted in the preceding paragraph,
Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act69
exempting insurance companies subject to state regulation from federal
antitrust regulation. Congress also could grant an exemption for
higher education. It already has done so with respect to the Robinson-
Patman Act: "[N]othing in [the Act] . . . shall apply to purchases
of their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities,
public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not
operated for profit. 70
Similar antitrust legislation exempting colleges and universities
could be passed. While such legislation would protect universities
from the short-term dislocations that might result from the application
of federal antitrust law, over the long-term this legislation probably
would stifle significant innovations in the field of higher education.
Until Congress takes such action, the Sherman Act should be held
applicable to the universities.
III. TYING ARRANGEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The Sherman Act condemns tying arrangements, agreements by
67. Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEc-
TION 313, 329 (1961). See Comment, Bar Association Fee Schedules and Suggested Al-
ternatives: Reflections on a Sherman Exemption That Doesn't Exist, 3 U.C.L.A.-
ALAsKA L. REv. 207, 234-36 (1974).
68. United States v. South-Eastem Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561 (1944).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq. (1970).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970).
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a party to sell one product or service on the condition that ,the buyer
also purchase a second product or service. 71  A tie-in is per se illegal
under the Sherman Act if three elements are present. First, there
must be two distinct products involved: the tying product, which is
generally the mnore desirable of the two, and the tied product, which
the seller links to the former as a condition of its sale. Naturally, if
there are not two or more separate products, there can be no tying ar-
rangement. Second, it must be shown that the seller has sufficient
power in the market of the tying product to adversely affect competi-
tion in -the tied product's market through the tying arrangement.
Third, "not an insubstantial amount ' 72 of commerce must be foreclosed
in the market of the tied product or service.73  Even if only the first
of 'these conditions is present, a tie-in may be declared illegal if it is
an unreasonable restraint of trade violating the "general standards of
the Sherman Act. "74  The elements of an illegal tying arrangement are
present in the bundled system of higher education.
A. Separate Products
By definition, a tying arrangement must involve two or more
products or services. These two products must be sufficiently distinct
and separate to convince a reasonable person -that they are not in fact
basically one product.75
The problem of the defining criteria of separate products has
proved especially challenging when two items, which may theoretically
71. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The condition
of the tying arrangement must be imposed in such a way that one must be "compelled
to operate [in one product] in order to obtain the [other]." Capital Temporaries, Inc.
v. Olsten Corp., 365 F. Supp. 888, 896 (D. Conn. 1973); see Edwin K. Williams & Co.
v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-E., 377 F. Supp. 418, 424-27 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Refrigera-
tion Eng'r Corp. v. Frick Co., 370 F. Supp. 702, 710 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
72. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); see Abrams, Tying
Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing Contracts, 53 CmcAGo B. RECoRD 75, 76-77
(1971); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 237 (1969); Note,
Product Separability: A Workable Standard to Identify Tie-In Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 46 S. CAL. L. RFv. 160, 161 (1972). See also Nelson, Tying Arrange-
ments Reconsidered: A Review of Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 15
ANnTRusT BULL. 7 (1970); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. REv. 50 (1958); Note, The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-In
Doctrine after Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 YALE L.J. 86, 91-93 (1969).
73. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See generally
Comment, Franchise Tie-Ins and Antitrust: A Critical Analysis, 1973 Wis. L REv. 847,
856; Note, The Logic of Foreclosure, supra note 72, at 91-93.
74. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500
(1969). See also 16 J. VON KAinowsrs § 6.02[1][o]; Abrams, supra note 72, at 78.
75. See Note, Product Separability, supra note 72, at 161, 163-65.
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be marketed independently, are nonetheless so functionally inter-
related that they may be considered a single product.76  Although
some commentators have purported to formulate workable standards
for determining whether or not a particular sale involves "different"
products, 77 one antitrust attorney has warned that "it is impossible to
predict how a court will decide the question of singleness. 78  Another
commentator has remarked: "The factual complexities that face a
court in making this determination are exacerbated by the lack of any
manageable standards. '7 9
There is precedent, however, to support a finding of separateness
in two types of cases: (1) when the products fall into different cate-
gories, i.e., when the products tied are recognizable as arising from -two
truly different lines of business, and (2) when the difference is qualita-
tive, as when one product of distinctly inferior quality is tied to a better
product, albeit of the same industry. In Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp.,s0 the Supreme Court found "categorical"
separateness where financial credit was being tied to the sale of pre-
fabricated buildings. On several occasions, the courts have held trade-
mark/patent licensing and business management services or business
supplies to be two separate items.81 More recently, product separ-
ability based on qualitative differentials has formed the basis of several
76. The tests for determining whether a particular sale involves "different" products
have never been conclusively established by the Supreme Court. See id. at 163. See
also The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 72, at 244-47.
77. See Note, Product Separability, supra note 72, at 165-69; cf. Turner, supra note
72, at 67-72; Wheeler, Some Observations on Tie-Ins, the Single Product Defense, Ex-
clusive Dealing and Regulated Industries, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1557 (1972); 4 SaToN HALL
L. REv. 610, 613-18 (1973).
78. Abrams, supra note 72, at 79 (footnote omitted).
79. 4 SETON HALL L. RLy. 610, 613 (1973) (footnote omitted). See also Ross,
The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach, 23 EMORY L.
REv. 963, 1013 (1974).
80. 394 U.S. 495 (1969). Fortner is the primary subject of discussion in Baker,
Another Look at Franchise Tie-Ins after Texaco and Fortner, 14 AN~rausT BULL. 767
(1969); Nelson, supra note 72; Tingle, Financial Assistance as a Tying Product-Fort-
ner Enterprises v. U.S. Steel, 25 BusiNEss LAW. 121 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, supra note 72, at 235-47; Note, The Logic of Foreclosure, supra note 72; 48
N.C.L. REv. 309 (1969); 31 Omo ST. L.J. 861 (1970); 23 Sw. L.J. 907 (1969); 21
SYRAcUsE L. REv. 245 (1969); 47 TEX. L. REv. 1449 (1969); 38 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rv.
483 (1970); 9 WASHBURN L.J. 282 (1970).
81. Tying arrangements involving patented or copyrighted tying products are espe-
cially suspect under the antitrust laws. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38,
45-47 (1962); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See
generally Timberg, Antitrust and Industrial Property: Tie-Ins and Grant Backs, 42
ANrrrausT L.I. 651, 653-54, 663 (1973). Although not copyrighted, college courses are
copyrightable and have the unique features of copyrighted material.
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tying cases. 82 After finding exhibition football games sufficiently in-
ferior in quality -to regular season games to be less desirable to paying
spectators, -the Second Circuit held that "the distinction between exhi-
bition and regular season contests is sufficiently sharp, at the very least,
to render the factual determination of product separability more appro-
priate for a trial than for summary judgment. '83
There appear to be only two constraints to -the finding of separate-
ness: first, a seller is not required to separate his product into the
smallest components that could conceivably be sold; and second, a
seller will not 'be compelled to unbundle its product if this would result
in awkward or inconveniently diverse business relationships. An
example of the first principle was demonstrated in Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States,8 4 where the Supreme Court held that
the publisher of a morning and afternoon newspaper did not violate
the antitrust laws by requiring advertisers to buy space in both news-
papers, thereby depriving advertisers of the option of advertising in just
one. The Court ruled that advertising access to the readership of both
morning and afternoon newspapers was, in fact, a single product. 5
The publishing company was free to sell its total circulation as a unit.
As a lower court stated, "It is apparent -that, as a general rule, a manu-
facturer cannot be forced to deal in the minimum product that could
be sold or is usually sold."86  Lower court opinions have applied the
second principle to condone a credit institution's practice of requiring
its borrowers to buy a "package" which included a certificate of title
prepared by attorneys designated by the institutions7 and -to sanction
a fruit wholesaler's condition that forwarding and loading services at-
tach to its sales.88  In these cases, if the antitrust laws prevented the
seller from marketing as single products either delivered fruit or credit
with title certification, the seller would have to deal continuously with
the many different agents of his purchasers-lawyers, loaders, and
drivers.
82. See Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974); American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272
(2d Cir. 1967); Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965).
83. Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291 (2d Cr. 1974).
84. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
85. Id. at 613-15.
86. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
87. Forrest v. Capital Bldgs. & Loan Ass'n, 504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974).




B. The Tying of Information Impartation to Accreditation
To establish a tying arrangement in higher education, it is first
necessary to identify the desired tying service and ,the tied, or less de-
sirable, service and then to show -that the two are either categorically
or qualitatively distinct. Although individual preferences undoubtedly
vary, the students most harmed by university tying arrangements are
probably those who wish to purchase accreditation only and not live
lectures by professors. Therefore, accreditation is the tying service
and impartation the tied service.
As discussed in the introduction, accreditation and information
impartation are clearly separate functions of -the university system.
Those who desire a record of achievement from a given -university may
not desire information impartation from -the accrediting institution.
Furthermore, different skills are involved in performing the two func-
tions. A good lecturer is not necessarily a good examination drafter
or grader. In addition, the two services are rendered at different times
and under different circumstances. The distinction 'between accredita-
tion and impartation is recognized at Oxford and Cambridge where it
has long been the responsibility of the colleges solely to teach and of
the university solely to test and to award degrees.a9  The -two func-
tions, therefore, fall into two different categories of products offered
for sale.
If examination results were kept secret and disseminated only -to
the students as feedback, it could be argued that tests are an integral
part of the information impartation process. A student who had done
poorly would continue to study a certain area, while a student who had
demonstrated mastery could move on to other subjects. In present-
day universities, however, there is tremendous emphasis on the final
examination at the end of a course. Even when a student barely
passes, he moves on to a different course. There is no further study
of the subject, no opportunity to retake the final examination, and the
grade is permanently recorded for various -uses.
It is sometimes argued that a college degree represents not only
examination results but also class attendance at the accrediting institu-
tion; therefore, accreditation encompasses class attendance. In fact,
however, almost all universities and colleges have voluntary class at-
tendance. A degree from these schools guarantees only that the stu-
dent paid for classes and not that he actually attended them. Employ-
ers appear unconcerned by this lack of guarantee of class attendance.
89. E. ASHBY, UNIVERSrrIES: BRITISH, INDIAN, AFucAN 25 (1966); C. HouLE 20.
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No special value is placed on the degrees of the rare colleges with com-
pulsory attendance. Furthermore, since college credits frequently are
transferred between institutions, a degree from a college does not even
guarantee that the student paid for four years of classes at that institu-
tion.
C. Market Power
For a tie-in to be illegal, the seller must possess "sufficient eco-
nomic power [in the market for the tying product] to produce an ap-
preciable restraint on free competition in the tied product.""0  Tying
arrangements "deny competitors free access to -the market for the tied
product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a
better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage
in [the tying] market." '91
The degree of market power which is required for per se illegality
in tying arrangements does not -rise to the level of monopolistic or
dominant market power. 92 In Fortner, the Supreme Court stated:
The standard of "sufficient economic power" does not. . . require
that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position
throughout the market for the tying product. Our tie-in cases have
made unmistakably clear that the economic power over the tying prod-
uct can be sufficient even though power falls far short of dominance
and even though the power exists only with respect to some of the buyers
in the market . . . . Accordingly, the proper focus of concern is
whether the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burden-
some terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of
buyers within the market.9 3
Under the standards set forth in Fortner, sufficient economic
power is attributable to a variety of market conditions, including good
90. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958); see Anderson v.
Home Style Stores, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
91. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
92. In Times-Picayune, the Supreme Court originally ruled that the Clayton Act is
violated when the seller enjoys either a monopolistic position in the market for the tying
product or if a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product is restrained, and
it further held that the Sherman Act is violated whenever both conditions are met. 345
U.S. at 608-09. Subsequently, however, in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1 (1958), the Sherman Act requirement of monopoly power or dominance in the tying
product was redefined. The Court held that the relevant market power test is satisfied
whenever the tying party has "sufficient economic power to produce an appreciable re-
straint on free competition in the tied produet" Id. at 11.
93. 394 U.S. at 502-04 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
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will or public acceptance, 94 the uniqueness of the tying product, 5 or
the size of the seller's business and the portion of the market con-
trolled by it." Power may also be inferred "from the tying product's
desirability to consumers" in conjunction with "the acceptance of a
burdensome tie-in by an appreciable number of buyers in the market
of the tying product . . . -07 Under any of these tests, virtually all
universities will have the requisite market power. The college degree
is so desirable that droves of students are prepared to acquiesce to the
tying together of information impartation and accreditation -by every
university. The universities manifestly impose burdensome terms such
as the accreditation-impartation tie-in on their students. Therefore, a
court applying the Fortner test should have little difficulty finding that
the "economic power" of any given college is sufficient -to produce an
appreciable restraint of free competition.
It is evident that the Fortner test for market power demands no
more than a showing of widespread tying practices.9 8 Only the Fourth
Circuit has suggested that if the seller proves that its tying arrangement
serves legitimate business purposes99 would a plaintiff have to establish
by further evidence that the seller has power over buyers in the market.100
Rarely will business purposes protect tie-ins.' 0 ' Because of the incon-
testable strength of university power in the accreditation market and
94. See Anderson v. Home Style Stores, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 125, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
95. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
96. Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 790 (S.D.
Tex. 1971), aff'd, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973); see I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New
York Fruit Auction Corp., 364 F. Supp. 868, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
97. McMackin v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 354 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
see Advance Business Syss. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 67-68 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); cf. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969).
98. See 394 U.S. at 502-04. Applying the Fortner test in Advance Business Syss. &
Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920
(1970), the Fourth Circuit stated that "a seller's successful imposition of a tying ar-
rangement on a substantial amount of commerce may be taken as proof of his eco-
nomic power over the tying product." Id. at 62.
99. The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the language of Fortner, 394 U.S. at 506,
as holding that a per se violation will be found "unless the defendant can show
legitimate business reasons for a tie-in . . . ." 415 F.2d at 68. However, other courts
have treated the questions of market power and justification of the tying practice as
distinct. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
100. See 415 F.2d at 67-68.
101. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
506-09 (1969); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50-52 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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the fact that this power way itself have no rational basis, it is unlikely
that, even in the Fourth Circuit, the universities could escape antitrust
liability. The attractiveness of an accreditor should depend primarily on
its accuracy and consistency, not on selectivity and strictness of
standards. An accrediting organization which reliably awards grades
from zero to one thousand should be more attractive to students and em-
ployers than an accreditor which refuses to grade most students, and then
even flunks out many of those bright students it deigns to grade.10
Ironically, if the accrediting and information-imparting functions of
higher education were unbundled, the irrational preference for selective
accreditators would probably dissipate, and eventually colleges would
lack the tying market power to tie impartation to accreditation even if
such a tie-in were legal.
D. Not Insubstantial Anticompetitive Effects
The final requirement for finding a tie-in illegal per se is that
"a not insubstantial" amount of business be actually foreclosed in the
tied market.' 0 3  In International Salt Co. v. United States, 0 4 the Su-
preme Court found that $500,000 worth of annual business "cannot be
said to be insignificant or insubstantial."'0 5  Similarly, in Fortner the
Court said:
[Niormally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total
amount of business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as
not to be merely de minimis, is foreclosed to competitors by -the tie
102. For a discussion of how accreditation organizations might function under an un-
bundled system, see paragraph accompanying note 122 infra.
103. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499
(1968); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958). See also ABA,
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1968-1971 34-37 (Supp. 1971); ABA, ANTITRUST DEVELoP-
mmNTs 1955-1968 105-08 (1968); E. SINGER, ANTrrusT ECONOMICS 196 (1968); 16H
J. voN KALNowsrI § 64.05[2]; Abrams, supra note 72, at 76-77; Nelson, supra note
72; Comment, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: Damages Recoverable for an Il-
legal Tying Arrangement, 78 DIcK. L. REv. 305, 308-10 (1973); The Supreme Court,
1968 Term, supra note 72, at 237; Note, Tie-out-A Case for the Extension of Tying
Theory, 35 OmEo ST. L.J 140 (1974); Note, Product Separability, supra note 72; Com-
ment, supra note 73, at 853-55; 4 SEToN HALL L. Rnv. 610 (1973).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has construed this language to create two sep-
arate tests: one of "not insubstantial" commerce involved, and another of "anticompeti-
tive effects." See Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1289 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3295 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974). Upon reflection, however,
it would appear that the Supreme Court intended to erect only one integrated require-
ment that a not insubstantial amount of competition be foreclosed in the tied market.
104. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
105. Id. at 396.
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[W]e cannot agree . . . that a sum of almost $200,000 is paltry
or "insubstantial."'10
The Court went on to make it clear that
[flor purposes of determining whether -the amount of commerce fore-
closed is too insubstantial to warrant prohibition of the practice, . . .
the relevant figure is the total volume of sales tied by the sales policy
under challenge, not the portion of this total accounted for by the par-
ticular plaintiff who brings suit.'0 7
The rationale supporting the "not insubstantial" test also has been
stated explicitly: "[B]ecause tying arrangements generally serve no
legitimate business purpose that cannot be achieved in some less re-
strictive way, the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition
provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie.' 08
Under this test, the tying arrangements of even the smallest col-
leges would foreclose "not insubstantial" competition. If live lectures
were not tied to examinations, students would probably purchase more
sound tapes, video cassettes, books, and other educational material.
Since the market in videotaped, sound-taped, or mimeographed college
lectures virtually has been foreclosed, the total volume of sales tied un-
der the typical university's economic policies is substantial.
Each requirement for a per se violation therefore has been met,
completing one count in the indictment against the tying of informa-
tion impartation to academic accreditation. 0 9
106. 394 U.S. at 501-02.
107. Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
108. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
109. Some lower court decisions have thought that certain unusual circumstances can
justify a tying arrangement that would otherwise be per se illegal. In Dehydrating Proc-
ess Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961),
a seller was permitted to tie silos to unloaders after demonstrating that half the custo-
mers who previously bought unloaders separately had demanded refunds because the
product did not work efficiently when installed in silos other than those manufactured
by the seller. In another case, a tie-in of unpatented components into a patented heat-
ing system was permitted because the tying product was guaranteed. Electric Pipe Line,
Inc. v. Fluid Sys., Inc., 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1956). See generally 104 U. PA. L. Rnv.
1123 (1956). Dictum in another opinion indicates that during the initial stages of a new
industry a tie-in may be justified if necessary to insure satisfactory performance of com-
plex equipment. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-57
(E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). It also has been suggested
that in order to protect its good will, a franchisor can engage in tyfng arrangements
when it is impractical or impossible to specify a substitute for the tied products. Susser
v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir.) (Friendly & Medina, JJ., concurring), cert.
granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), writ of cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S.
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E. Rule of Reason Violations
In addition to demonstrating that a tie-in is per se illegal, the
plaintiff 'has the further option of proving "on the basis of a more
thorough examination of ,the purposes and effects of the practices in-
volved, that the general standards of the Sherman Act have been vio-
lated."11  The rule of reason approach presupposes only that the
plaintiff can establish the existence of a business arrangement pro-
scribed by section 1 of the Sherman Act and that he can produce some
argument that the practice in question is unreasonable. Fundamen-
tally, the antitrust laws operate within good judgment to protect the na-
tion against all unreasonable restraints of trade."1 ' The general stand-
ards of the Sherman Act have been articulated in a number of classic
antitrust decisions,1 12 including Chief Justice White's opinion in Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. United States:
[T]he criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of
ascertaining whether violations. . . have been committed, is the rule of
reason guided by the established law and by the plain duty to enforce
the prohibitions of the act, and thus the public policy which its restric-
tions were obviously enacted to subserve.1 .3
In 1918, Justice Brandeis discussed the scope of this "rule of reason":
To detemine [whether a restraint is unreasonable] the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the re-
125 (1965). See also 16H J. VON KAILiNOWSKI § 64.05[l]; Abrams, supra note 72, at
78-79; Comment, supra note 73, at 866-68.
However, the holding of Fortner would appear inconsistent with the notion that
an otherwise per se violation may be completely immunized from antitrust attack by
special circumstances. 394 U.S. at 498.
Even if certain factors, such as the introduction of a new product or the protection
of good will, could remove a tie-in from the per se rule, such justifying conditions are
not found in American higher education. Most institutions of higher learning
have been in business for many years, and the prestigious universities can protect their
reputations in less restrictive ways. For example, an accreditor which insisted on test-
ing only a small number of individuals would not be precluded from reducing demand
by raising prices, using screening examinations, or employing any other technique which
did not involve restraints of trade. Universities could also award different classes of
degrees, as is commonly done in England.
110. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500 (1969);
see Comment, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, supra note 103, at 310.
111. See generally E. SINGER, supra note 103, at 198. See also Wheeler, supra note
77; Comment, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, supra note 103, at 307-08.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); A.
SrICKELLS, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BusmNFss: ANTITRuST LAws 111-14 (1972); 16 J. VON
KALNowsx § 6.02 (Supp. 1973).
113. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
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straint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.114
Under these admittedly imprecise standards, there exists a sufficient
degree of judicial discretion to justify holding the tying of impartation
to accreditation to be illegal as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
F. The Ultimate Test: Reasonableness
From a legal realist's point of view, it will always be the reason-
ableness of a particular restraint which ultimately determines whether
a court decides that the restraint violates the antitrust laws. Purported
per se antitrust analysis often reflects certain vestiges of a rule of reason
inquiry. "r As Professor Malcolm Wheeler perceptively observed:
"[P]er se rules . .. usually shift the focus from the basic issue of
whether trade has been or is likely to be restrained ,to the definitional
question of whether the challenged practice is . . .a tie-in."" 6
The single-product or single-service defense is the most difficult
obstacle faced by a plaintiff attacking the accreditation-impartation tie-
in. A court's decision on the single-service issue will depend largely
on its attitude toward the reasonableness of tying together -the two
educational functions. The rest of this Article will discuss the reason-
ableness of the two-function (accreditation-impartation) tying arrange-
ment and the four-function (accreditation-impartation-coercion-club)
tie-in. Both the rigidities of the present system and the advantages of
the unbundling will be described.
IV. Is THE FouR-FuNcTIoN TIE-IN REASONABLE?
A. Some Rigidities of the Bundled System
Although universities presently tie together the four educational
functions, these functions vary in importance and value -to different
students. A student who wants just one service, say accreditation, can-
not purchase just that. The rigidity and inflexibility of American univer-
sity education resulting from this packaging are illustrated by the fol-
lowing examples.
A student who desires a college diploma generally must attend
a single college for four years. Because of residency requirements, it
is almost impossible to spend one year at each of four institutions and
114. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
115. E. SINGER, supra note 103, at 198.
116. Wheeler, supra note 77, at 1557. See Comment, Private Enforcement of Anti-
trust Laws, supra note 103, at 307-08. See also E. SiNGER, supra note 103, at 198.
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earn a bachelor's degree. Furthermore, the student is forced to take
a specific number of courses per semester. Because of time conflicts,
he may be unable to take a desired course. Examinations are given
only at certain times. The student may not create his own tri-mester
or penta-mester system. He is not able to take one course compressed
into a short time period or ten courses simultaneously over a long
period. In addition, the student is deterred from varying the informa-
tion impartation techniques used to prepare for the final examination
in a course. Under no circumstances is he -allowed to pay a lower tui-
tion and just -take the test. Conceivably, students could independently
hire tutors, purchase transcripts of lectures at other schools, or buy
specially prepared video cassettes on the subjects they were studying;
but any expenditures on these items would be in addition to regular
tuition. Since the student must pay an extremely high fee for classes
even if 'he does not go to them, ,he is most likely -to simply attend classes
and not bother with other possible means of information impartation. 1 7
Still another example of the rigidity of the system is the inalter-
ability of final examination dates even if the student is not fully pre-
pared. Finally, there is also no choice as to the type of examination.
If a student decided he really knew the material, he might desire a
six-hour test or an intensive oral examination rather than a simple two-
hour test; but even if he is willing to pay a higher fee, he is rarely
offered the option of a different kind of examination.
B. Higher Education Unbundled
Perhaps the best way to convey the disadvantages of tying to-
gether education services would be to describe a 'hypothetical system
hiz which higher education was restructured along functional lines.
An unbundled education industry would contain both profit-oriented
and nonprofit firms and institutions. Education would be divided into
four subindustries: information impartation, accreditation, coercion,
and clubs.
Information Impartation Firms. The information impartation
subindustry would be profit-oriented, consisting of tutoring firms, book
publishers, video-cassette producers, and sellers and renters of books
117. If a student goes to fifteen hours of classes per week during a seventeen-week
semester, he will attend 255 hours of class. If his tuition for the term were $1,500 and
this sum were allocated entirely to the cost of classes, the average cost per hour of class
would be $5.88. If three quarters of the tuition were allocated to the price of classes,
the average cost per class hour would be $4.41. Despite the fact that most students are




and cassettes. Book publishing would operate much as it does today,
although there might be more programmed -texts and increased use of
mimeographing, photostating, and photo-offsetting to publish materials
for narrow markets. For example, good lectures offered at one school
would be mimeographed and sold to students at more than one college.
Educational video tape production would combine aspects of book
publishing and television program production. The video cassette
would be produced competitively by teams of authorities writing scripts
for simulated classroom situations, educational tours or demonstrations,
with actors and actresses playing the parts of professor and students.
The tapes would be pre-tested on students, and every variable from the
color of the instructor's tie to the number of jokes per lecture could
be considered." s The video tape performance could be dubbed into
foreign languages for promotion overseas where most countries provide
higher education .to only a small fraction of their populations. Cassette
publishers would furnish free programmed guides to their tapes re-
ferring viewers to other tapes for further explanation of troublesome
points. Cassettes would be marketed world-wide in suggested course
collections to students, profit-oriented and nonprofit libraries, conven-
tional colleges, television broadcasters, cable television companies, and
any other firm or organization which cared to purchase them.
Cable television may eventually become an important dissemina-
tor of college video courses. The Sloan Commission estimates that by
1980
[t]he majority of cable franchises will have a capacity of at least twenty
channels, that forty-channel systems will be commonplace or at least
well within the state of the art, and that even greater capacity may be
found in great metropolitan areas.. .. This is a conservative predic-
tion; . . . it is at least conceivable that ordinary channel capacity will
rise to eighty or above by the use of paired cables or more capacious
cables." 9
The Commission also believes that by 1980 between forty and sixty
percent of the nation's homes will have cable television. 20
118. The University of Southern California has a voluntary workshop designed to
make its teachers more interesting. The workshop is run by an actor, director, and a
comedy writer-performer, who adds jokes to lectures. Lancaster, Ever Hear the One
About the Professor and the Gag Writer?, Wall Street J., April 17, 1974, at 1, col. 4;
Heeere's the Prof. . ., TIME, Dec. 2, 1974, at 92.
119. SLOAN COM'N ON CABLE COMMUNICATONS, ON Tm CABLE: TM TELEVISION
Or ABUNDANCE 37 (1971).
120. Id. at 38-39. See also COMMISSION ON NoN-TEhDrnoNAL STUDY, supra note 2,
at 102-06; THE FoURTH REVOLUTION 20-21; Lapierre, Cable Television and the Promise
of Programming Diversity, 42 FORDHAa L. REv. 25 (1973); Molenda, CATV and Ac-
cess to Knowledge, 2 YALE REv. OF L. & SocuAL AcTON 243, 249 (1972).
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Independent organizations would also publish advice on how best
to intermix the tapes and books of different firms, and tutors would
give advice on what books to read and which tapes to view. In addition
to recommending educational material, tutors would also answer indi-
vidual questions and provide counselling, which would be necessary
since even the most sophisticated system of programmed video tapes
could not completely anticipate the needs of each individual student.
The tutoring industry would be extremely diverse and decentralized.
Some companies would have a large number of tutors and attempt to
build up a reputation for consistent excellence. Other tutors would
operate in smaller partnerships or as solo practitioners. No particular
degree would be a prerequisite to entering the profession. Those
tutors who were most talented would presumably command the highest
hourly fee. Sophisticated systems of programmed computerized in-
struction 21 and other unusual methods of information transfer would
eventually become a part of the dynamic, competitive, and profitable
impartation industry.
Accreditation Agencies. The accreditation agencies would have
the functions of test-drafting, test-marking, degree-awarding, paper-
grading, and possibly paper-assigning. Each agency would offer objec-
tive and essay examinations in various subjects. Readers of essay-type
examinations would be carefully -trained by the agency to grade tests
consistently and would be provided with manuals to guide them in the
grading of each particular question. To encourage consistency, graders
would be divided into different levels. Some of the tests graded by
the first or lowest level readers would be randomly selected for re-
grading 'by second level graders, who in turn would have some of their
tests selected randomly for a third reading by third-level graders-and
so on. Each student would be allowed to select one of several grading
systems-from a pass-fail grade to a numerical grade of zero to one
thousand. A student who felt that his test had been marked unfairly
could pay an extra fee and have his examination regraded. The size
of the extra fee would vary with the level of grader requested. 122
Accreditation agencies would grade papers and dissertations on
much the same basis as essay examinations. Although some firms
might grade only essays on certain topics, most firms would probably
be willing to grade any paper for a fee.
121. See generally R. LEVmN, THE EMERGING THCHNOLOGY-INSTRucrIONAL UsEs op
THE COMPUTER N HIGHER EDUCATION (1972).
122. Although wealthier individuals could afford to "appeal" their grades more often,
they would have no guarantee that the second grade would be higher.
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An accreditation agency would award diplomas on -the basis of its
own grades and those of other firms. The management of the organi-
zation would select the other agencies whose grades it would accept;
but once this decision were made, the actual degree-awarding process
itself would be quite mechanical, and only a small fee would be
charged for this service. Some accreditation agencies would be state-
supported or private nonprofit organizations. Others might be private
profit-oriented corporations. The profit-oriented accreditation agen-
cies naturally would do their best to attract customers. Nevertheless,
it is likely that the most profitable firms would be -the ones with the
highest reputation for reliability, integrity, and consistency. As long
as an agency had a broad enough range of grades (zero -to one thou-
sand, for instance), a prospective employer would not care whether the
agency was exclusive as long as its grades were consistent.
Coercion Firms. Accreditation agencies with a sufficiently large
scale of operations might offer tests in certain subjects as frequently
as once a month or even once a week. With freedom -to take tests
whenever they wished, students would have a tremendous choice of
work-pace.
For some students this flexibility in examination scheduling might
prove to be a curse rather than a blessing; but private enterprise should
be capable of devising ingenious ways of enabling students -to force
-themselves to work. For instance, a student might deposit a sum of
cash or a promissory note with a company on the condition that the
firm return portions of the funds on a weekly basis if the student did
his work and performed saisfactorily on a short quiz. If he failed to
do his work, he would forfeit his money. In effect, -the young person
would be paid a weekly salary to do school work. Less wealthy indi-
viduals would put smaller amounts of money into escrow, while richer
students would deposit larger sums; but the money in jeopardy would
be equally valuable to both groups.
Students might also contract in advance for harassment if they
slacked off in their studies during certain periods. The techniques
used by these work-coercers would be quite similar to those employed
by bill collectors. Coercive services such as these would only be pur-
chased by those students for whom general social and economic pres-
sures were insufficient motivators.
Clubs and Youth Centers. Since -the accreditation agencies and
book and video cassette publishers would sell their products and ser-
vices to anyone, there would be no prestige attached to patronizing any
particular tester or publisher. (There would, however, be value in ob-
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taining high grades, and there might conceivably be some prestige in
patronizing certain tutoring firms.)
It is quite possible that exclusive clubs of students would appear.
Individuals would join clubs for both the prestige of being a member
and the possibility of social and intellectual interaction with other per-
sons whose interests and intelligence were similar. Although some
entrepreneur might conceivably organize such clubs for profit, it seems
more probable that such organizations would not be profit-oriented.
Students who felt that exclusive clubs were excessively snobbish
would not be forced to join such clubs in order to meet other young
people. Centers probably would be founded in widespread parts of
the world. More affluent students might in a single year visit youth
centers in Rio, Berkeley, and Paris. Poorer students would roam about
less but might still dwell abroad during some period of their studies.
C. Advantages of the Unbundled Educational System
Restructuring education along functional lines would have many
advantages. The most obvious benefit would be the increased freedom
offered the student to choose what courses to take and where and when
to take them. The unbundled system would enable each student to
have his own individualized curriculum tailored -to his special needs.
Some young people might specialize early; others might sample many
different disciplines even at an advanced level before making any
decision to specialize. For example, with video cassettes a student in-
terested in law or medicine could take several courses in these subjects
without first being forced to make an irreversible decision.
The unbundled system would free young people from the need-
lessly rigid curriculum requirements sometimes imposed by colleges.
Employers and society at large probably have relatively flexible con-
cepts of a liberal arts education. Most non-academics are indifferent
as to whether someone they meet has had two semesters of laboratory
science or one year of physical education while at college. Two highly
esteemed institutions, Harvard College and Yale Law School, have very
few required courses. In theory, a student is free to choose a college
whose curriculum requirements match his own desires. In practice,
however, high school seniors are relatively uninformed about the edu-
cational policy of the college they choose. The decision to attend a
particular school is influenced by a great many factors, including cost,
location, social life, parental pressure, and prestige. Once a student
attends a school, it is difficult to -transfer. For students enrolled in a
college with inflexible curriculum requirements, moving from the tra-
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ditional system to the unbundled system would be like moving from
the local tyranny of a small company town to the cosmopolitan -toler-
ance of a large city.
The flexibility of the new system would be a boon to many individ-
uals who presently are unable to obtain higher education. It would
be much easier for poor youths to gradually earn a college degree while
simultaneously holding a job. Many older men and women who have
been frustrated by their lack of college or post-graduate education also
would have the opportunity to study conveniently for a degree.
An important benefit to everyone of the restructured system
would be the opportunity for continuing education -throughout life.
There would no longer be a dichotomy between school and the rest
of one's adulthood. Indeed, industry and government might require
their employees to maintain their expertise by taking courses. If a
more flexible workweek or work-year became commonplace, adults
would have ample opportunity to take additional courses and get ac-
creditation for each of -them. Career changes therefore would become
easier. The frustrated businessman who became interested in history
could take courses to become either an amateur or professional his-
torian. In the words of one educator:
However sophistioated or naive the discussion of . .. [unbundling]
may appear, at the heart of its advocacy lies the deep and perennial
egalitarianism of the American ethos, rooted in the belief that the in-
dividual should have as much education as he needs or wishes to de-
velop his potentialities. And in that ethos, the college or university
degree is the tangible manifestation that learning has taken place.12 3
The restructured system would have still other benefits, one of
which would be a decrease in neurotic competition. Without rigid
deadlines, education would be more relaxed than at present. Students
would no longer be forced to undergo the traumatic experience of tak-
ing all their examinations in just one or two weeks. A person could
take a test whenever 'he felt he had mastered -the material, or he could
decide to skip the examination if he had lost interest in a course. If
he did poorly on an examination, he could study some more and take
the -test again a month or so later. The "open admissions" policy of
accreditation agencies also would eliminate the oppressive rat race to
get into colleges and graduate and professional schools. Finally, the
increased emphasis on continuing education throughout life would
make it less important how one performed in any particular year.
123. C. HOumL 64.
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Specialization by function would improve the quality of education
provided. Video cassettes produced by teams of internationally distin-
guished personnel would be superior to most lectures presently avail-
able on any college campus. The well-developed tutorial system would
furnish the individualized instruction presently not offered by universi-
ties in the United States but which operates very successfully in
England.
Similarly, the tutorial and accreditation agencies would attempt to
find and train the best suited individuals with particular talents for
assisting or evaluating an individual student's educational progress.
Even coercion firms could do a more effective job of forcing individual
students to work than the present educational system, which often al-
lows students to procrastinate and to do most of their work at the end
of the semester. A further advantage would be the variety of clubs
formed, since each student could join those which suited his particular
interests.
Not only would the restructured system offer more individualized
and better educational services, but it would probably do so at a much
lower cost per student. Almost all of the high cost of the present col-
lege system buys information impartation. It is an incredibly expensive
and wasteful duplication of effort to have similar lectures delivered by
professors all over the world. There are fantastic economies of scale
in higher education which presently are not being realized. Once the
cost of a course were spread over a sizeable portion of the student
population of the world, the cost per student would be nominal.
Higher education could then be made available to all those who desired
it, whether -they lived in a ghetto in the United States or in the rural
areas of a developing Asian nation. Unbundling of higher education
in the United States would aid economic development throughout the
world, in poor and rich nations alike.' 24
D. Possible Objections to the Unbundled System
There are many possible objections to the unbundled system just
described, and this Article will attempt to anticipate the legal implica-
tions of a few of them.
124. For a different vision of an unbundled world of higher education, see Mood,
Another Approach to Higher Education, in UNvERSAL HIGHER EDUCATIoN-CosTs,
BENErrS, OPTIONS 293-310 (L. Wilson & 0. Mills eds. 1972). Also of interest are the
comments on Professor Mood's paper. Id. at 310-18. For other futuristic views of uni-
versity education, see CAwMus 1980-TMn SHAPE OF Tm Ftrrun IN AmmEICAN HIGHER
EDU cmION 149-75, 220-35, 279-98 (A. Eurich ed. 1968).
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Some individuals may fear that a few accreditation agencies would
become too powerful and effectively dictate educational policy through-
out the United States or even throughout -the free world. For several
reasons, this is highly improbable. There are only limited benefits to
size in the business of grading essay examinations. An agency which
graded essay tests would have to double its staff to double its business.
Moreover, it does not seem beyond the capacity of an employer to be-
come familiar with a wide variety of accreditation agencies-all of
which would be honest, reliable, and consistent but each with a dif-
ferent educational viewpoint-just as our society is now able to receive
graduates of hundreds, if not thousands, of colleges. It would not even
be surprising if firms appeared which specialized in evaluating and
comparing accreditation agencies, thereby enabling relatively small ac-
creditation agencies to prosper. Because students could take tests in
different nations with relative ease and because multi-national accredi-
tation agencies might open branches in many countries, higher educa-
tion in many nations might actually become less oligopolistic and elitist.
i. Centralization of power in the video cassette publishing industry
also seems improbable. Since any entrepreneur could produce and
distribute a taped lecture or lecture series without a prohibitive capital
outlay, one would expect that this subindustry would be almost as de-
centralized and diverse as the present-day international book pub-
lishing, record, or film industries (underground and aboveground).
The brisk competition between video tape publishers of different na-
tions would result in such an active international cultural cross-fertiliza-
tion that it would be impossible for any one publisher to dominate the
world of thoughts and ideas.
Earlier in this Article, escape from rigid curriculum requirements
was mentioned as an advantage of the new system. Some academics
may feel that this increased freedom is not beneficial but harmful. Al-
though this Article has a libertarian bias, this is not the place for an
extended discussion of paternalism versus libertarianism. Even in an
unbundled educational world, individuals dissatisfied with the way the
system operates could attempt to change its course by vigorously enter-
ing the marketplace of ideas with their own books, articles, cassettes,
and reviews of books and cassettes. Some accreditation agencies also
could grant special certificates for completion of certain rigidly defined
curricula. Employers and others would undoubtedly come to their own
conclusions about the worth of certain courses, so -that there always
would be social and economic pressure toward conformity, as well as
students who resist this pressure.
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Indeed, other critics may object that the restructured educational
system places too much emphasis on accreditation and the invidious dis-
crimination of grades. Students might feel less, rather than more, free-
dom under the new system.
Some persons might criticize the unbundled educational system
because it apparently does not encourage research, especially in the
laboratory sciences. But the search for knowledge would not be
stifled. Tutors and scriptwriters would be forced to do research to
maintain or improve their teaching or writing skills. Conventional re-
search journals would most likely still provide specialized media for dis-
seminating current research and giving researchers the pleasure of
seeing their work published. The federal government, private founda-
tions, and corporations could increase their subsidy of pure research,
and many private universities with substantial endowments could con-
vert themselves into predominantly research institutes.
To facilitate the teaching and testing of research techniques, es-
pecially in the laboratory, the unbundled system undoubtedly would
make certain adaptations. Accreditation agencies would administer
practical examinations; home experimental kits would be manufac-
tured;'2 5 and tutoring firms would give laboratory instruction, possibly
in connection with audio-tape instruction. 126  In the end, if it proves
impossible to unbundle certain forms of highly specialized instruction,
this instruction could be rendered by approved tutors who would cer-
tify student achievement; but this should be exceptional.
There are, of course, other problems with unbundling which might
be more intractable. Copyright violations might become difficult to
police or prevent, and the impersonal nature of the accreditation system
might conceivably encourage cheating. Careful proctoring and vigi-
lance could be used to deter dishonesty.
Ultimately, the most important concern is the quality of education
produced by the unbundled system. Defenders of present university
tying arrangements will undoubtedly assert that video cassettes are not
as effective as live professors. Empircal research demonstrates, how-
ever, -that personal instruction at the college level is not necessarily
125. Britain's Open University uses an ingenious home experimental kit in its science
courses. Walsh, supra note 11, at 676.
126. There have been experiments with audio taped individual laboratory instruction
at Purdue University and at Golden West Community College in California. S. BASKIN,
HIGHER EDUCATION: SOmE NEWER DEVELOPmNTS 63 (1965); Trm FoumTH REVOLU-
TION 17-18; Kiester, Electronic U., SATuRDAY REV. OF EDUCATION, May 1973, at 56; see
1973-74 Catalog of Golden West College, Huntington Beach, California.
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superior to instructional television. In 1966, a review of 207 published
studies comparing instructional television and conventional teaching in-
dicated that there was probably no significant difference; sixty-three
found television instruction to be superior; and fifty showed conven-
tional instruction to be better.127  After analyzing the actual data con-
tained in forty-two comparative studies in which a total of 348 com-
parisons of final examination results had been made, two experts com-
mented: "The conclusions of our comparative analysis are un-
equivocal . . . . In the most intensive analysis across many studies
yet made, we can find no evidence to dispute -the conclusion -that one-
way television is as good as other college instructional media."'1 28
Empirical research questions the superiority of lecture and/or
discussion over independent study. A major investigation in 1968
pooled the data from a large number of studies conducted between
1924 and 1965 on the relationship between achievement and instruc-
tional arrangements. The study showed that there was no discernible
difference between lecture and discussion, between lecture and lec-
ture-discussion, between supervised independent study and face-to-
face instruction, between supervised independent study and lecture,
between supervised independent study and discussion, between super-
vised independent study and lecture-discussion, between supervised in-
dependent study and unsupervised independent study, and between
even unsupervised independent study and face-to-face instruction.
Under the subtitle "In a Word-Nothing," the authors conclude:
"These data demonstrate clearly and unequivocally that there is no
measurable difference among truly distinctive methods of college in-
struction when evaluated by student performance on final examina-
tions."'0
Several large-scale studies not included in the above pooling anal-
ysis have generated similar conclusions. Experiments at Antioch Col-
lege"3 ° and the University of Colorado showed that drastic reductions
in class time had no adverse effect on content understanding.' 3' A
study at Miami University in Ohio, using classes of different sizes, com-
127. C. Cau & W. ScmAMM, LEAMING FROM TELEVISION: WHAT THm RESEARCH
SAYs 100 (1967).
128. R. DUBIN & R. HELEY, THE MEDIUM MAY BE RELATED TO THE MESSAGE-COL-
LEoE INSTRUcVION BY TV 1-2 (1969).
129. R. DUBIN & T. TAvEGGIA, THE TEACHING-LEARNING PA.Abox-A CoMPAATIVE
ANALYSIS or COLLEGE TEACHING METHODS 35 (1968).
130. Antioch College, 1957-58 Experiment on Independent Study, 1958.




pared three educational formats with many variations-television, lec-
ture, and discussion-and found no significant differences among any
of the groups taught by different methods."8 2
In the words of one leading commentator, Ohmer Milton:
Consistently, . . .such variables as class size, frequency of class
meetings, and manner of presentation [including independent study],
when considered in isolation, have been demonstrated to wield no major
impact upon learning as measured by the usual tests. Even when some
of these variables have been combined, their influence appears to be
quite minimal ....
* ' * Because of 'the consistency of the results in different institu-
tions of higher learning-for example, selective and non-selective ones
-and the disciplines in and among them, a far-reaching conclusion, and
one which undoubtedly is disturbing to many faculty members and stu-
dents, can be drawn about the teaching of subject matter content: If the
content of a discipline can be defined as a body of information and con-
cepts, the way or ways in which ideas or concepts are organized, and the
methods by which knowledge is sought, and if it is acceded that class
examinations measure content primarily-there being no research
evidence to the contrary-then the explanations of such content by the
instructor in the classroom, by whatever method, contribute little to the
learning of content.133
In summary, the possible objections to the unbundled system are
not persuasive. In light of the research on learning, the case for un-
bundling is overpowering. Students should at least be given the option
of purchasing less expensive media of instruction free from the
restraints of anti-competitive educational tying arrangements.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Supreme Court once remarked that "[t]ying arrangements
serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.' x3 4
The tying arrangements in higher education are no exception. The
tying of impartation to accreditation cannot be justified and greatly
harms society. Under abstract antitrust principles, this unreasonable
tie-in violates the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the judiciary might
be reluctant to mandate such a radical transformation of American
higher education. Even so, changes will come; but they will be evo-
lutionary rather than revolutionary.
132. ExPERmENTAL STUDY N INSTmUCrONAL PROCEDURES (F. Macomber ed. 1957).
133. 0. MiLToN, supra note 2, at 23-24 (emphasis added).
134. Sta.dard Oil Co, v, UVitd States 337 V ,S, 293? 305-06 (1949),
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The slow evolution toward unbundling has already begun. As
mentioned in the introduction, there are already several external
degree programs which offer accreditation with little or no tied im-
partation. The nation is becoming increasingly receptive to public ser-
vice television and national testing services. Already, many individuals
give such tests as the Graduate Record Examination, the Scholastic
Aptitude Test, and the Law School Aptitude Test more weight than
grade point averages or transcripts.
While the evolutionary process toward unbundled education has
begun, colleges which have tied their services for centuries will un-
doubtedly be resistant to change.185 However, pressure from several
sources will overcome this resistance. There is increasing pressure on
American society to provide a college education to all those who want
it, while at -the same time the financial cost to society of providing a
university education is rising to almost prohibitive levels.136  In 1972
institutions of higher education spent approximately thirty billion dol-
lars.137 College students also are beginning to demand reforms in what
-they consider to 'be a ,largely anachronistic and arbitrary educational sys-
tem.
Unbundling of higher education along functional lines offers the
hope of increasing the quality of lectures, making more individualized
instruction available, changing education into an ongoing process con-
tinuing throughout life, and offering students remarkable freedom of
choice as to courses, schedules, work-pace, and place of residence.
Most importantly, this improved education could be provided to many
more individuals throughout the world at much lower cost. The anti-
trust laws can unleash these benefits for our society, and the courts
should declare illegal the tying arrangements in higher education.
135. See generally R. EVANS, RESISTANCE TO INNOVATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION-A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ExPLORATON FocusED ON TELEVISION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
(1968).
136. See note 4 supra.
137. CoMMrrEFE FOR ECONOMIC DEvELoPMENT, supra note 4, at 13.
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